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## THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM.

GEORGE V. KRACHT.

THE term internationalism is commonly employed to designate a set of interdependent beliefs which center around the postulate that the interests of mankind can no longer be served by activities, customs and institutions which tend toward the eventual ascendancy of one homogeneous racial type. The remote ideal of the movement is, briefly stated, a world in which each of many diverse races shall function in its own specific manner and develop according to the secondary purposes that the character of its people prescribe, and yet exist wholly for and by the general life of the whole. Formally, the structure of a society so organized would resemble that of the present United States of America; essentially, it would be marked by these fundamental differences: that the constituent units would be heterogeneous in character, and that the values embodied in its institutions would be antagonistic to the qualified nationalistic values to which America in common with all great countries, now adheres.

Formulated in these general terms, the creed of internationalism seems, if visionary, at least altogether innocent and harmless; and it is, in fact, only when the revolutionary attitude of mind, as revealed in these major articles, grapples directly with the realities of social life and seeks ways and means of bending them to its purposes, that it excites the reckless criticism to which it has been subjected. The reason for this is not obscure. One of the main contentions of internationalism is that world peace can be secured only at the price of a full and unqualified acceptance by dominant nations of the values which it defends, and such a statement undeniably becomes a veritable instrument of torture when employed against those who fondly hope to eliminate organized warfare from human affairs, and at

the same time retain unmodified the intra-racial activities which have invariably forced nations into a condition of armed antagonism. It is not to the ideals of the movement that the world objects; but only to the claimed conditions of their realization.

At the present time, for instance, a world, shocked by the tragic spectacle of the late war, has formally adopted the general aims of internationalism. The right of small nations to determine their own destiny within wide limits is universally conceded; the principle that the policies of large races should be subordinated to the common welfare of the entire human race is vigorously upheld, and most minds are agreed that a definite central tribunal, powerful enough to coerce refractory social units into obedience to its decrees, should be set up, in order that the interests of society may be defined and maintained by some impartial body, instead of being settled, as they now are, by the moves of partisan diplomats and, ultimately, by the employment of force. Yet side by side with such phenomena there is going on a significant intensification of nationalistic values and a correlative acceleration of those processes which inevitably bring nations face to face with the tragic necessity of choosing between dishonor and war. And it is his insistence upon this indwelling contradiction between our formally professed ideals and our practical activities which has brought the internationalist under the fire of all other sections of thought. Because of his indifference to the mechanical contrivances by which men hope to avert wars, and because of his assertion that, since international relations are determined by intra-national activities, the one cannot be perceptibly modified without the other, he has incurred the enmity of those who hope to harmonize, in some unknown way, the ends of war with those of peace; while, on the other hand, his direct assault upon the policies which invariably terminate in war, has earned for him the antagonism of their defenders. If he sides with the latter in their opposition to a league of nations, it is merely to take up the conflict on more fundamental grounds; if he

takes issue with the former, it is only because he feels that all social forces are interdependent, and that, consequently, the problem of securing peace is much larger than they care to assume. And it is this attitude which has engendered the storm of abuse recently heaped upon those who have identified themselves with the internationalistic movement; this insinuation of insincerity, unconscious but none the less real, on the part of those who advocate a league of nations predoomed to impotence; this charge of a contradiction between our professed aims and our determining actions. Yet what could demonstrate more clearly the superficial character of our present striving for permanent peace than the almost universal unwillingness to discuss rationally and calmly the necessary price of it? Impassioned supporters of a central tribunal, defenders of its abstract conditions, we have in plenty; but scarcely more than one or two have dared to assert that the effectiveness of any agency established must depend upon our consent to submit to it all differences arising between nations, even when they bear upon such questions as tariff, immigration and foreign trade policies, and even when they directly affect the line of internal industrial expansion. To the evolutionist the point is so obvious that any elaborate proof would be thought superfluous. Believing that there is sufficient power in forces now operating to dash into pieces any mechanical device set up to dam them, the problem, as he sees it, is not one of finding the means of interposing an armed and impartial barrier between conflicting groups of peoples, but of turning men's wills and minds to the practical acceptance of values which will create no deep seated antagonisms; and the progressive solution of this problem will, he perceives, carry the race to sacrifices which few men are now willing to make.

Such a contention, however, does not pin us down to a policy of optimistic fatalism, or to an impotent waiting for the dawn of the millennium. Writers who, like Roland G. Usher, declare that "the trouble lies in selfishness, wickedness, ignorance, and a lack of morality and Chris-

tianity in mankind," and that "nothing short of the slow process of education and growth, by which the bad will be made good and the covetous and greedy will be reformed, seems capable of creating universal peace" fail to understand that our hopes may center about that very selfishness which they deplore as fatal to the reign of peace. They make the question needlessly large, and commit us to the impossible task of converting human beings into angels by a vague preaching of morality; whereas, as we shall see later, the difficulty is not to extirpate selfishness from the heart of man and so turn him into an idealistic altruist, but to direct his selfish motives into other channels. Is it not, for that matter, even now apparent that our rebellion against the horrors of war is selfish, individualistic, and substantially equivalent to a revolt against the sacrifices which the masses are called upon to make for the welfare of the race? And do not the most brutally direct advocates of war—writers such as the late Professor Cramb and the German Bernhardi—make their appeal to the sentiment of duty, and found their arguments on the presumption that the individual should be made to give his all in order that the ideals of his nation may sway the world? If it be true that international peace can be honorably bought only at the price of a voluntary surrender of much that man holds dear, it is decidedly not true that the sacrifices called for are of the nature of a deliverance of our personalities into the hands of altruistic formulæ. Were that the case, the discussion of the possibility of world peace would never have passed out of the works of poets and dreamers into the pages of popular magazines and newspapers. It is the uttermost folly to say that war can never be abolished until the Christianity of Tolstoy is established on earth, and particularly so at a time when internationalists are called upon to face the charge that their creed demands a subordination of national aspirations to the personal desires of existent generations. The selfish aggressions of individuals may, as Mr. Usher contends, be the basic cause of all inter-racial conflicts, but it is also

individuals who suffer when the inevitable conflict begins. And in their suffering we come upon the real reason for the present demand for an international tribunal of peace; not in any sudden flowering of Christian ethics or second springtime of Comtism. As we shall see later, the spring of our present development toward the ideal of the internationalist is essentially the very opposite of altruistic; and when we speak of sacrifices involved in this evolution we do not mean unrecompensed ones, but merely sacrifices of one set of desires to another. It is precisely because of this that the charge that pacifists are attempting to wreck their states out of a sentimental love of the masses has obtained widespread credence; it is precisely because of this that those who hold nations to be sovereign units, which must realize themselves no matter what be the cost in terms of human suffering, have accused internationalists of rebellion against duty and its synonyms—God and religion. Obviously we cannot, even to please our opponents, be both white and black, preachers of thin ethical generalities and rebels against our obligations. One charge or the other may be true; both cannot be; and since the two cancel one another, in all probability neither is wholly true nor wholly false, but both no doubt represent instinctive reactions of the non-centered mind to diverse aspects of a single complex evolution. This much, at least, may be said at once, by way of clearing a breathing space amid the heaped up mass of argumentative rubbish with which the field of discussion has been littered.

A line of reasoning, directly contradictory to that indulged in by those who reduce the problem to moral terms, is the one elaborated by Norman Angell in "The Great Illusion." Far from believing that we must wait upon a moral renaissance, Mr. Angell holds that the interests of the human race lie clearly and unmistakably in the direction of international peace, and that this fact has only to be recognized in order that war may become the name for an historic condition. War, he claims, is no longer economically profitable, and it is only our fatuous simplicity which leads

Vol. XXX.—No. 3

us to believe that any struggle can show a credit balance either for victor or for loser. In perspicuous language he has pointed out that conquered territory belongs, not to the conqueror, but to the inhabitants of it, and that the people of a nation are not enriched one penny by the annexations paid for in blood and treasure. War, in short, is a losing proposition for both parties engaged in it, and once this fact is understood, Mr. Angell believes that the imperative will of civilized nations will put a stop to it.

The solution, fascinatingly simple though it is, seems to me to ignore the most elementary factors in the situation and to implicitly deny the necessity for any mental and emotional groundwork of peace. Even though we unreservedly admit Mr. Angell's first assumption, that all wars between civilized races involve irreparable economic losses, is it demonstrably true that there are no other values concerned for which men, coerced by the pressure of circumstance, will not gladly lay down their lives? Is it even true that the economic interests of *races* lie directly in the path leading to international peace, and that, in seeking the one, they shall come upon the other? Supposing that the four or five great nations of the world can come to some joint agreement with regard to the exploitation—or development—of outlying countries, and the peaceful extermination, by industrial penetration, of inferior races, unable to stand up under the relentless discipline of modern life; supposing, further, that some agreement, mutually satisfactory, can be arrived at, by which periods of international misproduction, which now terminate in a few years of fierce competition, national uneasiness, hate and eventually war, can be safely traversed by means of a central equilibrating influence, and the necessary readjustment of industrial agencies be thus peacefully effected; these are large concessions, but supposing the conditions realizable, is it at all certain that the highest ends of society shall be best served by them? Not at all; and the truth is that Mr. Angell has confused the immediate economic interests

of *individuals* with far-distant social and racial interests, and has failed to perceive that war is the product of forces, inherent in the organism, which are possibly directing its development toward ends whose meaning far transcends any question of temporary loss and gain. There are, in short, more values on the world's balance sheet than Mr. Angell has taken into account, and his argument becomes valid only when it is considered as an integral part of the organic scheme of thought which internationalism defends. Let it once be admitted that the expansion of a type rich in organizing ability and practical intelligence—such as the American, for instance—will be marked by recurrent conflicts, and it will be seen that war, instead of imperilling the economic interests of the human race, is the faithful servant of them. This will become clearer as we proceed.

The apparent conclusiveness of the arguments elaborated in "The Great Illusion" is the result of a bold, though unconscious, assumption at the outset of the only point that can be open to rational discussion between nationalists and internationalists. "Let us assume," writes Mr. Angell, "that at the cost of a great sacrifice . . . Belgium and Holland and Germany, Switzerland and Austria, have all become part of the great German hegemony; is there *one ordinary German citizen* (the italics are my own) who would be able to say that his well-being had been increased by such a change? Germany would then 'own' Holland. But would a single German citizen be the richer for the ownership? The Hollander, from having been the citizen of a small and insignificant State, would become the citizen of a very great one. Would the *individual* Hollander be any the richer or better?"

To all of which the nationalist may, and does, answer,—Very well; but have you not deliberately ignored the only debatable point and thereby invalidated your entire argument? You think in terms of individuals, whereas we assert that the only unit of which the evolutionist can legitimately talk is the race. And the interests of a race are, as Benjamin Kidd has shown, often divergent from those



of any one generation of its members. Has it not been the universal experience of history that the population of annexed territories sooner or later falls into a subordinate position and eventually disappears? True, with the stabilization of racial types, the time required for this change becomes longer, but the final result is not, therefore, the less uncertain. And if the conquest of Holland by Germany, South Africa by Britain, or Mexico by the United States, be the necessary preliminary to the peaceful, economic penetration of those countries, is it at all certain that the ultimate product, measured even in dollars and cents, measured more adequately in terms of large and prosperous cities, stable and progressive civilizations, and natural forces subjugated to man's ends, would not vastly outweigh any transient sacrifices called for?

The same assumption that the interests of the present coincide with those of the future is still more apparent in another famous passage of Mr. Angell's work.

"During the Jubilee procession," states the author, "an English beggar was heard to say:

'I own Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, Burmah, and the islands of the Far Pacific; and I am starving for a crust of bread. I am a citizen of the greatest Power of the modern world, and all the people bow to my greatness; and yesterday I cringed for alms to a negro savage, who repulsed me with disgust.'"

"What is the meaning of this?" asks Mr. Angell, and he answers that "international politics are still dominated by terms applicable to conditions which the processes of modern life have altogether abolished." The statement is true only if racial expansion is absolutely and forever prohibited by the conditions of which Mr. Angell speaks, or if the instinctive attempts of races to extend their ideals and civilizations do not inevitably engender war. Should the former assumption be justified by the facts, then our instincts and the language to which they give rise admittedly have no rational meaning; should it be untrue, and the latter true, the movement toward international

peace necessarily takes on a significance which cannot be exhausted by any statement in purely economic terms.

Unfortunately Mr. Angell has not given to this phase of the question the attention its importance merits. Having examined the relations which subsist between Great Britain and her colonies, and having shown that the internal policies of all but India and a few other Oriental settlements are determined by their respective inhabitants, he triumphantly concludes that the "nations are too firmly set" to permit of any further extension of racial types. "Even when the British, the greatest colonizers of the world," he states, "conquer a territory like the Transvaal or the Orange Free State, they have no resort, having conquered it, but to allow its own law, its own literature, its own language to have free play, just as though the conquest had never taken place. This was even the case with Quebec more than one hundred years ago. . . ."

Let us first see what the conquest of the Transvaal really did establish, or whether the facts warrant the belief that the war with the natives was a monstrous fallacy. One thing at least is certain; that out of British ascendancy in that territory has come the right of Englishmen to emigrate into South Africa in whatever numbers they wish, without fear of being discriminated against by the laws of the land. Could this have been secured without the preliminary subjugation? Hardly; for one of the immediate causes of the conflict was the discriminatory laws passed by the natives, and behind these laws, again, was the justifiable fear of the Boers that, once Englishmen were admitted to their land on terms of equality, their race, as a distinct unit, functioning in world affairs, must begin to die away. And this, despite the permission extended them to legislate as they wish on internal matters, and to retain their language, literature, religion, etc., is exactly what will happen in the course of time. The interval may be long or short; but the instincts which move men to secure the continued existence of their specific type have their proper terminus only in far distant ages, and it was to the

operation of these that the war was due. In order to deal frankly with the premises of the nationalists, we must look to the remote future, and not to immediate and transient phenomena, and with our vision so fixed, it becomes translucently clear that our changed policies with regard to colonies are not less fatal to the race of their first inhabitants than were the cruder policies of the Hebrews and Canaanites. It matters not that we do not exterminate them, man, woman and child, by the sword; that our results are accomplished by the peaceful and less painful instrument of commercial penetration. Once grant that the race is the only legitimate unit in society, once admit that our instincts would be valid, could they be effective, and the entire argument against war on Mr. Angell's grounds breaks down.

Looking into the future we see in the Transvaal a tract of territory in which the Anglo-Saxon can, and will, establish his institutions, his customs, laws, literature, language, and every thing else he holds valuable; a land, moreover, which will at crucial moments assist in the further extension of the Anglo-Saxon race, until the time comes when the race may be so powerful that it can spread itself unopposed even into those nations which, like France and Germany, seem so fixed in their places. This is the real meaning of the fight for "a place in the sun"; of Germany's desperate attempt to force the hand of destiny; of England's magnificent schemes of colonization; of America's dawning realization of the part she may be called upon to play in the world; of the war advocate's insistence upon the legitimacy of his own race's will to realize itself *to the utmost limit of its possibility*. If it does not put forth its greatest efforts now, the time will come, he sees, when his race must submit impotently to the peaceful penetration of a more powerful type, to the later use of its governmental agencies against itself, to the final disappearance of his state from the earth.

The present conquests of large nations are, understood in this sense, an insurance against future eventualities;

reserved spots which they can slowly and gradually, but none the less surely, reclaim for themselves, from which they can keep out large numbers of other peoples that they may be unable to absorb, and which may possibly be the determining factor in the final gigantic struggle which will decide, once for all, what race shall rule the world. It may be said that no nation, having annexed a territory, passes any restrictive laws against other peoples; that the land is free and open to all, and is, in this sense, still a common field for development. This is untrue. The only reason why no laws now appear on the statute books against such an immigration is, that the necessity for them has never arisen, because nations tacitly understand that any attempt on their part to assist in the work of peaceful subjugation, if carried out on a scale sufficiently large to endanger the possessor race, would be defeated by legislation, behind which would stand the menace of armed force. Colonies are no more open to all peoples than is the United States to the Japanese. Nothing could show the operation of racial instincts more clearly than our own recently imposed restrictions on immigration, because of the fear that distinctively American qualities might be lost through the influx of other types faster than they could be absorbed.

The case of Quebec is unique, and Mr. Angell has seized upon it as an illustration of his theory with the instinct of an advocate, rather than that of a philosopher. Yet who to-day doubts that, despite the apparent fixity of French customs and language in that province, they must finally give way before the slow pressure of Anglo-Saxon thought? Certainly not the very inhabitants themselves, who, warned by those instincts which often read more truly than the most enlightened reason, are already bitterly protesting against the fast accumulating evidences of their eventual fate as a race, and who are desperately striving to stave off the inevitable consummation. Possibly the issue cannot be definitively decided without a civil war, but in any case, it is as certain that Quebec shall one day be indistinguishable from Ottawa, as it is that the sun shall rise

to-morrow. And what shall happen to Quebec in the next few generations *may* happen to France, or England, or Germany, or Holland, five centuries after that. It is this possibility that the war advocate takes as the premise of his argument, and against it all reasoning on economic grounds is futile. For it is not true, he affirms, that if present processes continue, racial expansion is forever and absolutely prohibited by the conditions of modern life; and because we find in that expansion the germ of all conflicts, because there will be wars so long as races aim to enlarge themselves, and also because, in his opinion, the real ends of society are served, as our instincts tell us, by such racial activities, he concludes that war, howsoever deplorable in its effects, is defensible as a regrettable, but necessary, issue of forces which are tending to create the only conditions under which peace will ever be possible; the dominance upon earth of one homogeneous type, united by identical language, ideals, customs, manners of speaking and acting, economic interests, mutual trust, and vital interdependence of classes.

We may now glance, though necessarily in a very summary way, at the manner in which the international values, so defended, connect up with national schemes of values, and show how the two mutually create and intensify one another. What is called the instinct toward racial expansion is, of course, nothing more mysterious than the manifestation on a racial scale of the sexual instincts, plus a perfectly natural desire on the part of the people to continue to live under the laws and institutions to which they are by nature adapted. If these impulses, and the values which they create—national and international—have a significance which stretches far into the future, it is not because they are the flame tips of some great central intelligence, but merely because instincts are better able to move among the realities they rear than our faltering, and still unsocial, reasons. True though it be that oftentimes the most patient research is unable to lay bare the deeper meaning of such prejudices as those which are expressed in racial aversions,

in sharply drawn color lines, in the identification of one's self with a nation and its abstract future, in religious systems, moral codes unsanctioned by legal formulæ, and in the pride of belonging to a big country or city, we are not, therefore, bound to discuss them as things sacredly mysterious, nor to hold to them when the processes they set in motion are seen to tend toward ends from which our intellect dissents. Reason is a manifestation of what we agree to call Nature just as legitimate as are our instincts, and if it be seen that the two are more often contestants than allies, then there can be no *a priori* presumption in favor of either.

This being understood, we may deal more directly with the concrete problem before us. Pressure of population upon the national agencies of production and exchange, plus the desire upon the part of all individuals to retain their identity as members of a specific race, with particular ideals, laws and institutions, is, as we have seen, the fundamental fact in our present scheme of international relations. Now, not only is this same fact which creates inter-racial jealousies and war also intensified by the fear of war—as witness the present wide-spread propaganda against directive control of the birth rate and the charge brought against the inhabitants of France, that in looking to their own selfish interests, they almost fatally weakened their race!—but it is also the force which creates that set of values popularly termed capitalistic. This is readily apparent when we consider that capitalism is really nothing more than a plan of industrial organization, under which the larger fraction of the people are coerced by their instincts into the surrender of the means of present enjoyment, in order that the necessities created by an ever enlarging population may be effectively dealt with through rapid expansion of the agencies of production and exchange. Furthermore, as both capitalism and unregulated sexual impulses foster the quickest racial development, and thus rapidly put a race in a position where it can maintain itself against aggression and at the same time extend its own

territories, they are intensified by the very fears they themselves create, and thus are organically tied up with one another and with all other values. The same is true of orthodox religious systems, the function of which is, as Benjamin Kidd has shown, to sanction the individual's sacrifice of himself to the interests of the future; and from some obscure perception of this fact flows, we may be sure, the antagonism of many internationalists to orthodox creeds.

Mark, moreover, how vital is the inter-connection between all our instinctive reactions to social phenomena, and how the destruction or modification of one of them involves the destruction or modification of all. War and the fear of war create, as we have said, the capitalistically organized state, and this state in turn gives birth to the very conditions by which it was created. But both of these phenomena, again, are the products of unregulated sexual instincts, which also are acted upon and intensified by the forces to which they give rise; and into the scheme of things, so constituted, orthodox religious creeds enter to set the seal of their approval upon all prejudices, traditions and institutions, while all these phenomena, fused into an organic whole, engender and justify those minor reactions of the individual consciousness, which lead it to claim its race as part of its very self, and which compel it to sacrifice itself to the race's future, as it would to the objects of its dearest regard, not only on the battlefields, but also in the peaceful pursuits of life. And behind all is the dominating thought that the ends to which a race is driven by its instincts are the only ones which the processes of evolution legitimize, and that to these ends the individual is and should be subordinated.

Now, when we critically review the controversial literature devoted to the defence of the nationalistic set of values, we find that this defence invariably consists in a reiteration of the fact that the values in question are so organically united that no single one of them can be attacked without menacing the whole, and that the inevitable result of a

successful assault would be the collapse of the civilization built upon them. Let one say, for instance, with Norman Angell, that war and the language of war are meaningless monstrosities in the world as it now exists, and he is met by the retort that, howsoever desirable the ideal of international peace may be, the dominant activities of nations render it impracticable, and the teachings of pacifism dangerous. This, in fact, is precisely the stand taken by Roland G. Usher in his *Pan Americanism*, and obvious though it may appear to be at first sight, when the empty outline is filled in with the wealth of detail at Mr. Usher's command, the conclusion appears almost irresistible to the pacifist who would abolish war and, at the same time, retain unchanged the ideals of which it is the issue. The Socialists, tacitly admitting the force of such objections, have thus been driven to the other extreme, equally vicious, and have insisted that the destruction of capitalism must antecede the death of war. This position is, however, not less vulnerable than the one taken up by those who consider the problem of securing peace as a special and exclusive one; even when it is formulated in proper language, and states, not that the capitalist class promotes wars for its own interest, but that social processes directed by "capitalistic" values inevitably terminate in inter-racial conflicts. For true though this may be, and even admitted by the nationalist, he quickly points out that Socialism is impossible in the present state of affairs, for the evident reason that the embodiment of its ideals in the institutions of any race would necessarily weaken it to such an extent as to leave it practically defenceless in a world armed against its welfare. And likewise with all attacks upon the unregulated operation of religious, sexual and other instincts! To the defence of these other prejudices quickly rush, and point out the essential dependence of the race upon them.

Decisive as these objections appear to be, they are, however, disconcerting only to him who fails to grasp the true and revolutionary significance of the movement against



which they are advanced. Let it once be comprehended that this movement represents an *internationalistic* attack upon all the institutions reared by instinct, and it will be clearly seen that these special defences of nationalism fall to the ground, except in so far as they bear upon the point of immediate practicability. For thus interpreted, all these apparently isolated movements toward world peace, economic independence, new creeds and ethical systems, a modified nationalism, accentuation of esthetic and intellectual values, and toward rational control of the birth rate, are seen to be vitally connected, and the strength of internationalism is perceived to lie in elements quite different than those commonly considered. Taken in this sense, effectively to dispose of the movement, it is not sufficient to point out the inherent weaknesses of its special manifestations, and to prove that its immediate conquest of our minds would result in untold disaster. We may grant this much unqualifiedly, and still keep our central defences intact, just as the nationalist may agree to the major premise of Norman Angell, and still insist that his argument leaves the really important issues undisturbed.

Naturally this involves that we should view internationalism in its true historical position; that we should, so to speak, consider it, not as the name for a set of values which can at once be incorporated into our social life, but as marking a comprehensive evolution of thought and feeling towards ends antagonistic to those currently accepted. Rising above all the practical details in which this development is immersed, we must let our minds dwell upon the fact that these related movements, of which I have spoken, are really only the various aspects of one great central attitude toward man and his activities, and that it is this attitude which is the basically important thing, and not the practicability or impracticability of the isolated, concrete demands to which it gives rise. Grant that this be true, grant, that is, that the ends which this spirit constructs into ideals are socially desirable and within the reach of human endeavor, and though we may still differ from the

avowed internationalist upon minor questions of fact, our concession nevertheless amounts to a practical surrender of the adverse position. We are then no longer opponents of the movement, but only of its more particular demands.

What, then, is this central viewpoint, or habit of thought, which is the spring of activities so significant? Lecky has very aptly termed it "rationalistic," and in one of the concluding chapters of the work devoted to the history of its origin and first manifestations he has made the pregnant observation that its transforming influence would, in the course of time, play upon and modify every established institution of society. The statement has now passed into a truism, and we tread upon well worn ground when we point out the essential connection between the attitude which decisively triumphed over the theocratic ideals of the Middle Ages and the political absolutism of the later centuries, and that which now challenges on an international scale, and more fundamentally than ever before, every end toward which a society moved by unregulated instincts would carry us. But when we attempt to reduce this spirit to a dead formula, we find that it eludes our most persistent efforts, and that a definition can no more exhaust its real essence than can an epigram exhaust a living personality. The difficulty is an insuperable one; recast our formulæ as we may, they leave one cold and unconvinced, and with a feeling of the utter inability of intellect to deal directly with life. Take for example Taine's famous reduction of Goethe's message to the phrase, Learn to know yourself and things in general. How trivial and commonplace it seems to a mind which has not drunk of the great secrets hidden in *Faust* and *Wilhelm Meister*! How pregnant and suggestive to one who is able to fill the empty outline with the meanings with which Goethe has enriched his heart and mind! And in the same way, though on a larger scale, one who has become acquainted with that habit of thought which now dominates the internationalistic movement, through the works of Lecky, Bentham, the Mills, Paine, Stephen, Rousseau, and in fact every writer

of genius for the past few generations, feels how vague and unimpressive must all his formulæ be when placed beside the living fact. It was Eliot, I believe, who in her review of Lecky's history of the origin and first phases of rationalism, complained that the author had constantly made use of the phrase "the spirit of the age" without giving it any precise significance. This was unjust. For Lecky's whole attempt was to fill the concept with meaning, and one might as well have asked him to define it as to define an autumn sunset, a poetic thought or a rhapsody of Liszt's. Before such a request the keenest mind stands helpless as a child.

Notwithstanding such obstacles, some attempt must be hazarded, in order that the real meaning of the movement which we have called internationalism may be fixed, however imperfectly, in the reader's thought. In one way we have a decided advantage over the first great historian of the development. The generation in which he wrote furnished to the world by far the ablest interpreters and defenders of reason's values since the Renaissance; and since that time, the aims and purposes of the creed's adherents have become translucently clear. We have seen, for instance, tentative steps taken toward the formation of an international labor union, whose avowed function would be to regulate the policies of nations in conformity with the interests, economic, moral and intellectual, of the *present generation*; we have witnessed a world-wide struggle engendered by the failure of a group of nations to move away from the old ideals *pari passu* with others, and have seen, as the direct issue of this conflict, the formal adoption by representatives of many large powers of aims directly antagonistic to those advocated by imperialists; and we have also perceived the first two transient ends of the movement, the separation of church and state and the recognition of the right of all individuals to participate on equal terms in the conduct of the government, definitively established in countries, which, united, are able to direct the activities of the entire world. Nor have other signifi-

cant signs been wanting. The entrance of organized labor into politics; the recent manifestation on the part of our industrial leaders of a readiness to abandon old ideas in favor of the new; the spiritual awakening of religious institutions to the need of broader ethics and less rigid dogmas; the startling drop in the birth rate in France and England; the universal feeling that all races make distinctive contributions to the world's progress, and that their integrity must be preserved against the destructive influence of more powerful types; the renunciation of the principle of *laissez faire* and the qualified adoption of the principle that the true function of government is to act as a directive, regulative power in the body social; all these phenomena point unmistakably to a world-wide growth away from the values reared by unregulated instincts, and show that the influence of rationalism is steadily transforming every institution once regarded as final. And enriched by such experiences, we can undertake, without effrontery, to trace the essential points of difference between the purposes of nationalism and those of its rival. The exposition, however, must necessarily be diagrammatic in the extreme.

It has frequently been remarked that reason is essentially individualistic; that it relates everything to concrete, living men, and boldly postulates that evolutionary processes are meaningless unless their accomplished ends include the promotion of human happiness. The observation is abundantly illustrated in modern literature. J. S. Mill assumes it as a self-evident truth; Bentham transforms it into a Greatest Happiness Principle; Locke asserts that the end of government is the good of mankind; Paine, in his "Rights of Man," finds incomprehensible Burke's faltering defence of man's duty to his race. The belief in this theory drives Rousseau to a mad revolt against civilization; Spencer accepts it as unquestionable, and takes as his ideal a state of society in which the interests of the individual will coincide with the interests of all; it is formally enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence,

and has just recently been restated by President Wilson as a truth from which no one can dissent.

Furthermore, our modern reading of the meaning of the Reformation leads us to the same conclusion. In this, as in the political and religious rationalism into which it quickly developed, we can now discern the fundamental assumption to be that the individual is the only legitimate social unit, and that his reason, corrected and confirmed by the reasonings of others, and thus, so to speak, built up into a social intellect, is competent to direct society to its highest ends. This was the premise which Paine maintained against Burke in their beautifully developed debate on the French Revolution, and Burke, instinctively seizing upon it as the ultimate ground of the antagonism, frankly and finely declared that "instead of casting away our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them *because they are prejudices* (the italics are my own); and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherished them." Contrast this with the penetrating observation of Hugo, probably the greatest of all radicals: "It is a peculiarity of instinct that it can be troubled, thrown out, and routed. If not, it would be superior to intelligence, and the brute would have a better light than man." The issue could not be more sharply drawn; both statements touch rock-bottom, and in them we have potentially all the difference between a Hugo and a Burke, a Rousseau and a Carlyle, or, to bring the antagonism nearer to our own times, between Professor Cramb and Norman Angell, Chesterton and H. G. Wells.

Now, if we examine in this light the major values which sway the minds of internationalists, we shall find that they, too, are sharply distinguished from all others by their imperative insistence upon the supreme importance of the individual and his happiness, as well as by the fact that they all implicitly affirm the superiority of reason's to instinct's ends. When one's mind passes over the bound-

ary lines of races, it does not come to rest in some vague idea of a universal humanity; on the contrary it recoils back upon its object, disintegrates races into concrete persons, and frames a concept of duty which includes the future only so far as its welfare can be harmonized with the happiness of the present. Those who have read Norman Angell's work "The Great Illusion" with care must have been impressed by the fact that it revolves almost entirely around this central conception. At no time does he ask whether the English race, or the German race, or the human race, is enriched by the results of conquest? Would a single German or a single Englishman be richer or more happy? is his persistent inquiry, and his answer, the only answer that can be rationally given, is, of course, the negative. The same individualistic viewpoint pervades and informs Barbusse's "Under Fire"; a work from which no one can rise without a sickening feeling that man is helplessly floundering on stormy seas, at odds with destiny. What, he asks indignantly, is the meaning of the phrase "national aspirations" in this world where nations consist of an artificial amalgam of races residing within the map made lines of a frontier? Do not lines of social cleavage, deeper and more impassable than any others, cut across all nations? Has not the workingman of America more in common with the workingman of France than he has with the American philosopher or financier? And what earthly difference can it make to an existing individual whether the race which inhabits his country ten thousand years from to-day be his own, or French, or Anglo-Saxon, or Slavic?

Commonplace as such inquiries seem to be, they are so only to one who has not measured the chasm by which they are separated from the thoughts which now sway the world. And yet surely it must be evident that a line of reasoning which starts from the premise that the individual is the ultimate social unit is bound to develop important differences from one which assumes the race to be transcendent. Given the latter, and though we may qualify the

legitimacy of our national activities by the assertion that they should be subordinated to the welfare of the world, our final conclusion, the one which reigns over our conduct, will always be that, when a conflict arises between our national ideals and the impartial thought of mankind, the only arbiter of the dispute can be the sword. Given the former, admitted to its fullest implications, and the only logical conclusion can be that any racial differences are trivial and subordinate when placed beside the fact of our common humanity. The antagonism is ultimate, and any compromise between the two viewpoints must be based upon expediency, and, therefore, be transient.

Nevertheless, it is not right to say with Benjamin Kidd that this movement, which we may now call "international individualism," seeks to place all the meaning of evolutionary processes in the present. Rather, it is attempting to reconcile the interests of the present with those of the future; it asks where social forces, engendered by unregulated instincts, are driving us, and is not content with the vague answer that, because past progress has been the resultant of certain factors, future progress must also depend upon the same. That is the crux of the question, and no apotheosis of evolution can furnish us with a satisfactory answer. Adherents of the movement admit that we owe a duty to the future, but they also claim that this duty should not rob the present of its rights to life and happiness. And they seriously question whether the fortune we are now engaged in building up for our descendants is the very best we could bequeath to them. They believe, indeed, that in asserting our own rights, in refusing to allow our personalities to be totally absorbed by an abstract race, we are bringing about the only rational reconciliation of our interests as individuals, as Americans or Frenchmen, and as members of the human race, with the interests of the future. In proof of this they point, first of all, to Socialism.

This inner significance of this latter movement has been so obscured by its avowed defenders that it is impossible

to do more than throw out a few suggestions. They talk at one time of a society moved forward by a bitter class struggle, and at another of the generally accepted theory that society is an evolving organism; they speak of forces which are tending to submerge the individual consciousness in the social, and defend a platform so intensely individualistic that it might have been written by Paine or Rousseau; their ideals are at once a super-state and a sort of abstract essence of humanity. Purposes and aims absolutely irreconcilable abound in the shape of party dogmas to such an extent that the real meaning of the socialistic movement has almost been lost sight of. It is impossible to rescue it from this confusion in a few words.

Taken in its vaguer sense, Socialism is a fast-moving evolution of thought and feeling away from the values created by the instincts we have previously examined toward those created by reason. Its real purpose is, thus, not to create a leaderless society, but to put in the foreground ethical and intellectual values which have been lost sight of; that is, to organize the race around the idea that the production of full and rich personalities constitutes the only intelligible end of evolution. The economic consequence of this would be a retardation of the rate of industrial progress, not only because of the operation of psychological restraints on the birth rate, but also because the freeing of a people from the tyranny of exclusively pursued economic ends would necessarily put a stop to the reckless expenditure of energy which has characterized the past. This is the admitted result when such a change of values takes place in the life of an individual; it cannot be otherwise when the same phenomenon occurs on a racial scale.

A state organized around this purpose could not, however, defend itself for more than two or three generations against more prolific types, pursuing contrary ideals. Consequently, the socialistic movement becomes an integral part of the world development toward universal peace; not only because its complete success is conditioned by the



international acceptance of its values, but also because world peace in turn depends upon the formal embodiment of those values in the institutions of all great nations. This does not involve, as some Socialists have presumed, that we must discard the nation as an active unit in society; only that it shall manifest itself in such a way that it will at all times function for the good of mankind, as generally recognized, by making its prime aim the production of complete and rounded personalities. Thus understood, evolution becomes a process by which individuals pass from primitive anarchy and communism, through societies so highly organized that they practically crush all personality, into a fuller freedom. If orthodox Socialism seems many times to deny this truth, it is merely because its aims are still obscure to most of its adherents. Maturity will bring a clearer vision.

We may now define the issue between nationalism and internationalism more sharply. All these collateral movements of which we have spoken—toward peace, toward the accentuation of intellectual and moral values, toward fewer and better babies, toward a new concept of duty—have this in common; that they are the result of the application of an individualistic viewpoint to the various aspects of social life. They have for their chief end the rescuing of personality from the crush of social forces by the bringing about of some reconciliation between the claims made upon man as a member of a particular race, as a member of the human race, and as an individual entitled to happiness and a certain degree of self-realization; and it is the two latter claims that are emphasized against the former. This, let us frankly admit, is a purely selfish end; to a sordid mind it may even become a sordid end, but noble minds transfigure it into a noble one. The same statement holds, it need hardly be said, with regard to the nationalistic set of values; so that the controversies which have been waged around this point are totally irrelevant to the real issue. What ends society shall pursue depend, of course, upon the manner in which the individual sees his self-interest, and

Lecky has laid bare the real distinction between the motives behind the antagonistic movements we are discussing when he made use of the phrase "enlightened self-interest." Naturally this does not commit one to a belief in the theory that man has been pursuing false ends through countless centuries; a Rousseau or Paine was defensible only before Darwin and Spencer. And we can to-day clearly understand that the purposes of Rationalism have been legitimized only by the international character of the development toward them.

Nevertheless, it remains strictly true that the magnificent sacrifices which marked the evolution of races in the past have been mostly involuntary, the results of the coercion of conditions engendered by the play of individual aims. Man, therefore, need be neither more nor less selfish in order to accept the aims of internationalism; he need only be more enlightened as to his own interests and thus more amenable to the influence of remoter considerations. We might as well speak of the altruistic qualities which led the primitive savages to organize, as to talk of a higher Christianity, manifested in conduct, being necessary for the success of internationalism. Obviously all that is required is the evolution of mental structures that are able to perceive the sacrifices involved in a society driven onwards by unregulated instincts and to modify their conduct accordingly. And if the inevitable consequence of this would be the taking of some of the meaning of evolutionary processes out of the future and placing it in the present, that is only what must be expected of a highly self-conscious society. In the past our instincts rightly made us the unwitting servants of the future; modern conditions make it possible for us to reshape our purposes, without proving traitor to our duty. That, concretely, is the ultimate justification of internationalism, considered in all its manifold and varying aspects.

The great defender of British Imperialism, in what is probably the most magnificent defence of war ever written, has finely stated:

Thus the great part which war has played in human history, in art, in poetry, is not, as Rousseau maintains, an arraignment of the human heart, not necessarily the blason of human depravity, but a testimony to man's limitless capacity for devotion to other ends than existence for existence's sake—his pursuit of an ideal perpetually.

This is inexpressibly beautiful; the interpretation by a noble mind of a past which has too often been given over to the sordid and superficial! Yet, after all, it leaves unanswered the two penetrating questions of internationalism: Are the aims of war any longer defensible? Will man submit to the conscious sacrifices which a state organized around an affirmative answer demands of him, not only on the battlefield but also in the peaceful pursuits of life, when the interests of the present are seen to lie clearly in another direction? One is inclined to think that the history of the past two hundred years furnishes a decisive answer. Above all, the ideals for which four great civilizations recently fought have been formally declared by their representatives to be those of world peace; and while I do not believe that we can now safely accept those ideals in their fullest implications, the goal is visible on the horizon. No single generation has ever made such large strides toward it as we have, for we have proved our right to travel on the road which leads to it by a devotion which has never been surpassed.

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